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SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF EMPLOYEE STOCK-
PURCHASE PLANS
JEFFERSON B. FORaDHAM*
A large body of literature has accumulated in the past two decades
on the subject of employee stock-purchase and ownership.' Prac-
tically all of it, however, approaches the matter from the standpoint
of policy or statistics.2 This study is mainly concerned with the im-
portant legal problems involved. A brief factual survey is necessary
at the outset.
Employee stock-purchase plans, though varying in details, may be
said to include generally the following features: (1) A fixing of eligi-
bility for participation. (2) A provision setting forth the kind and
price of shares to be sold under the plan. (3) A fixing of the maxi-
mum subscription open to employees. (4) A method of payment
for shares (usually by installments without the privilege of imme-
diate full payment in cash). (5) A reservation by the company of
title to shares till full payment. (6) Provisions governing such
contingencies as temporary and permanent termination of employ-
ment. (7) An option to or an obligation upon the company to
repurchase paid-up shares upon cessation of the employment. (8)
Provisions as to the revocability of subscriptions. (Subscriptions
are often made revocable at the option of employees without any
forfeiture of previous credits.) (9) Special benefits to participat-
ing employees. (10) Time limits of the plan. (11) Reservation by
the company of power to terminate the plan.
The more common purposes which they are set up to effectuate
are these: (1) to stimulate systematic saving on the part of employees
and afford them a convenient and paying investment ;3 (2) to give the
* Sterling Fellow, Yale Law School, 1929-1930, J.D., University of North
Carolina, 1929.
'See Laura A. Thompson, A Selected Bibliography, Employee Stock Owner-
ship in the United States. From the Monthly Labor Review of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor, for June 1927.
'Two particularly informative works are THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CON-
FERENcE BOARD, Inc., EMPLOYEE STOCK-PURCHASE PLANS IN THE UNITED
STATES (New York 1928), and R. F. FOERSTER and ELSE DIETEL, EMPLOYEE
STOCK OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (Princeton 1926).
'The E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company state this purpose in their
plan in this happy way: to afford "an incentive to employees to start the
accumulation of income-producing property." Quoted in Foerster and Dietel,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 7.
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workers a share in the extra earnings during a prosperous business
period; (3) to give the employees a share in the management; (4) to
serve as additional compensation; (5) to stimulate the interest of the
employees in the business and thereby increase their efficiency; (6)
to minimize the turnover of labor; (7) to provide the business with
ready capital.
The idea of offering stock to employees, little known or applied
before the "turn of the century," and not extensively put to use
until after the World War, is now being exploited by hundreds of
corporations the country over, including such giants as the Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Company, the United States Steel
Corporation and the General Motors Corporation. 4 It was estimated
in 1928 that employees of American corporations held stock therein
aggregating over $1,000,000,000 in money value,5 or about one per
cent of the stock holdings of the country. The employees often con-
stitute a large percentage of the total shareholders but their holdings
are usually relatively small.6
The forces of organized labor are not in sympathy with employee
stock-purchase schemes but regard them as left-handed' concessions
or favors to mollify labor and enervate the labor program with its
principle of collective bargaining.7 There are labor unionists who
believe in democratizing industry through labor union capitalism, not
by buying stock under company plans but by organizing labor's capital
reserves through labor banks, labor savings and independent invest-
ment.8
Whatever may be the verdict of the controversialists, it is certain
that the capitalists have started something of perceptible significance
in the task of adjusting industrial relations, though doubtless un-
attended by a spirit of altruism in many instances. Conceivably
public ownership of the elements of production will be the final out-
come. Aside from the desirability of that ultimate possibility, labor
"Foerster and Dietel, op. cit. supra note 2, appendix B, at 103 et seq.
'National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., op. cit. supra note 2, at 39, 40.
* Ibid., table at 39.TAinerican Federation of Labor, Reports of the Executive Council at the
45th Annual Convention (1925), at 21, 22. J. P. Noonan, President of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Engineers wrote in his comment upon
"Labor Investment Suggestions" (1926), 33 American Federationist 1191,
1192, "we view the whole practice as vicious from a trade union standpoint at
least-." But see the comment of Daniel J. Tobin, Engineer, on the same
occasion at p. 1196 et seq.
'J. B. S. HAIMMAN AND AssocIATEs, AMERICAN LABOR DYNAMICS (1928),
44.
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must rely for the effectuation of any program upon organization.
The fact that labor's capital resources are relatively inconsequential
does not invalidate the working conclusion that they are of great
importance when mobilized.
It is the natural order of things that law follows rather than leads
business. But it should never lag more than a step behind and here
is a development worthy of at least a glance from the legal profes-
sion. In this connection the legislative follow-up of the development
will be indicated as the discussion proceeds.
1. Initiation of employee stock-purchase plans.
By what authority are these plans adopted and put into operation?
Certainly positive statutory authority is not essential though statutory
inhibitions such as those against stock-watering and to protect pre-
emptive rights must be observed. Some ten states have statutes
authorizing these plans and in six instances stockholders' action is
expressly required for the initiation of a plan.9 And it would be
the part of prudence to submit the plan to the stockholders in any
case even in the absence of statutory provision therefor. If a plan
should necessitate the issuance of a new class of stock or an increase
in capital stock, shareholders' action would be required unless the
directors were expressly empowered to act. It seems, however, that
treasury stock may be disposed of by directors' action alone, subject
in some jurisdictions to pre-emptive rights.10
2. Pre-emptive rights.
The essential difficulty in this connection is that of adjusting
the individualistic principle of pre-emptive rights to the advance-
ment of the collective interests of the members of the corporate enter-
prise. Quite undesirable results may follow where a few shareholders
'California, Laws of 1921, chap. 34, §1; Colorado, Laws of 1923, chap. 89,
§2; Illinois, Laws of 1923, p. 282; Louisiana, Laws of 1928, Act 250, §28 (there
is no express requirement but the use of the expression, "a corporation may"
inaugurate a plan, suggests the necessity of corporate action) ; Michigan, Pub.
Acts of 1921, Act 84, part II, chap. 2, §14, as amended by Pub. Acts of 1927,
Act 335 (provides that "any corporation" with capital stock and organized
for gain may inaugurate a plan); New Jersey, Laws of 1920, chap. 175, §2(a) and (b) ; New Mexico, Code 1915, §939, as amended by Laws of 1921,
chap. 19, §1 (here again the power is given to the corporation thus leaving
to the corporate body the adoption of a method of exercising it) ; New York,
Cons. Laws, §14, as amended by Laws of 1925, chap. 178; Ohio General Cor-
poration Act, §122 (the choice of a method of exercising the power is left to
the corporation) ; Pennsylvania, Laws of 1925, Act 368, §1, p. 679.
" It has been held, however, that retired treasury stock is subject to pre-
emptive rights. Dunn v. Acme Auto and Garage Co., 168 Wis. 128, 169 N. W.
297 (1918).
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by the exercise of pre-emptive rights may hold up important meas-
ures in the conduct of the business. Where such rights exist as to
stock to be sold to employees they must be disposed of when the
plan is adopted. In the absence of statute the adjustment could be
effected in the corporate charter in the form either of a provision
cutting off the pre-emptions of all shareholders, or an authorization
for a stated majority of shareholders' votes to waive the pre-emptions
of all," or by a particular provision making all stock to be sold to
employees free from pre-emptive rights.
Several states have by statute confirmed the pre-emptive rights
of shareholders to a limited extent12 In doing so they have con-
tributed to the confusion as to the character of the rights. Conse-
quently, an effort to attain some clarity of concept about these rights
is required before proceeding with our special problem.1 24
Pre-emptions have been allowed to stockholders in order that they
might be able to maintain their relative positions in the corporate
body. With the modern complexity of stock issues, involving issues
with and without par value, with and without voting power, and
numerous other bases for classification, it has become impossible to
preserve a shareholder's relative position in every phase of his interest
as such.' 3 As recently demonstrated, the only practicable or nearly
practicable basis for the right is the preservation of voting power.' 4
'The new Indiana Corporation Law provides that there shall be no pre-
emptive rights as to corporate stock save as fixed and declared by charter or
by resolution of a board of directors acting under charter authority. Acts of
the Indiana General Assembly, 1929, p. 734. This is quite a sane disposition
of the business.
'Arkansas, Laws of 1927, Act 250, §19; Florida, C. L. 1925, §20; Louisiana,
Laws of 1928, Act 250, §28, II; Nevada, Laws of 1925, chap. 177, §23; Ohio,
Gen. Corp. Act, §35; Pennsylvania, Act of 1874, §17, as amended by Laws of
1876, p. 32, §2. The Uniform Business Corporation Act has no provision on
pre-emptive rights. See UNIFORm LAws ANN., vol. 9, Supplement-1928.
The Arkansas statute, to take an example, provides that unless otherwise
declared in the charter every stockholder shall upon a sale for cash of any
new stock of the corporation of the same class as that which he holds have a
right to his pro rata share at the price at which it is offered. Arkansas Laws
of 1927, Act 250, §19. Under this statute where the charter of a corporation
has not otherwise provided the relative position of a stockholder is maintained
only as to his own class of stock and not as to the corporation. Thus it does
not protect an old par stockholder from a new issue of non-par stock at a low
figure though both his and the new are voting and fully participating shares.
Moreover, the fact of a sale for cash has no relation to the conception of pre-
emptive rights.
"See A. H. Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
563.1
" Ibid. It is true that giving shareholders of one class of stock pre-emptions
as to all new issues of that class is workable but generally it would be of no
substantial value in preserving relative corporate status.
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How to dispose of pre-emptive rights which threaten a given plan
de~ends first upon the class and source of the stock to be issued.
It has been held that pre-emptive rights exist only as to increases
in capital stock and not as to new issues of originally authorized
capital stock.1 5 But while few courts have had occasion to make
more than an indefinite declaration that pre-emptions attach to "new
stock" there is authority for the more logical view that the rights
apply to new issues of originally authorized capital stock.16  It has
been decided that treasury stock, bought in and retired, is upon re-
issue subject to pre-emptive rights.17 But the resale by a corporation
of fully paid-up shares, which had been donated to the company,
has been held not subject to pre-emptive rights.' s It appears that
the logic of the recognition of pre-emptive rights extends to ordinary
treasury shares but the law as it is laid down in the cases is to the
contrary.19 It is believed, however, that stock bought in the market
for resale to employees is not subject to pre-emptive rights and many
companies have followed this practice. In any event reference should
be had to local statutes and decisions.
The legislatures which have made provision for stock sales to
employees have, with a single exception,2 0 attempted to provide for
the settlement of the possible claims of a stockholder who votes
against the adoption of a plan. The Ohio statute disposes of the
matter summarily by providing that there shall be no pre-emptive
rights as to stock to be sold to employees under the statute authoriz-
ing sale to the workers.2 ' It is provided in New Jersey that dis-
'Curry v. Scott, 54 Pa. St. 270 (1867).
"This is probably the most favored view. Snelling v. Richard, 166 Fed.
635 (C. C., S. D. N. Y. 1909); Titus v. Paul State Bank, 32 Idaho 23, 179
Pac. 514; Bank of Montgomery v. Reese, 26 Pa. 143 (1856). And see the
dictum in Crosby v. Stratton, 17 Colo. App. 212, 68 Pac. 130, 132. (1902).
"Dunn v. Acme Auto and Garage Co., mipra note 10.
" Crosby v. Stratton, supra note 16. It is to be noted that "treasury stock"
as the term is used here refers to stock once issued but now held by the cor-
poration as a result of purchase or donation, and not, according to the definition
in some of the texts, stock reserved out of original unissued capital for par-
ticular purposes. 5. FLarcEaR, CoR'oRAToNs, pp. 5601, 5602: And see Mackey
v. Burns, 16 Colo. App. 6, 64 Pac. 485, 488 (1900). Compare Provident Trust
Co. v. Geyer, 248 Pa. 423, 94 AtI. 77 (1915).
' See State ex. rel. Page v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266 (1876) and the dicta in Borg
v. International Silver Co., 11 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 2d 1925) and Bonnet v.
Eagle Pass First Nat. Bank, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 613, 60 S. W. 325 (1900). This
is the Louisiana rule by statute, Laws of 1928. Act 250, §28, II (b) (3).
"The New Mexico statute, Code 1915, §937, as amended by Laws of 1921,
chap. 19, §1, simply authorizes the sale of stock to employees without reference
to stock-selling plans.
' Ohio General Code Annotated, §35, sub-sec. (b).
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senting shareholders may sell their holdings to the company under
an appraisal by three disinterested parties appointed by the circuit
court of the county in which the corporation has its principal office
upon petition of the dissenter.22 Since the statute provides that the
appraisal is to be made without regard to any change in value due
to the adoption of the plan a dissenter, whether he elects to sell or
not, loses any pre-emptive rights that he might have had.
The California statute indicates a more careful effort to adjust
the difficulty generated by a dissenter.2 Recognizing the principle
that existing law enters into contracts, this enactment provides the
dissenter with an option to sell to the company (as under the New
Jersey act) but only as to stock issued prior to the enactment of the
statute. It permits the corporation to consent at the time when the
appraisal is completed to issue the dissenter his pro rata share of the
stock to be sold to the employees. Under the Colorado statute the dis-
senter may demand the right to his pro rata share but the right is
waived if demand is not made in writing and within the period
limited.24 The Pennsylvania statute provides for an appraisal of the
damages, if any, resulting to the dissenter by reason of the sale to
employees as well as for an appraisal of the value of his shareS. 25
The corporation may then elect to pay the damages or to buy the stock
at the appraised value. And upon failure to do either within thirty
days the damages become a judgment against it.
In Louisiana stock to be sold to employees may be so disposed
of free from pre-emptive rights only with the written consent or the
affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of shares entitled to
exercise pre-emption with respect thereto.26 It is provided in the
same statute that only voting shares carry pre-emptive rights and
they only as to shares allotted for other than cash, or to satisfy
option or conversion rights and except as to treasury shares. In
Michigan provision for a special kind of stock, "industrial stock,"
for sale to employees seems to obviate any trouble over pre-emptions. 27
Though it has required some space to present and discuss the
subject of pre-emptive rights as it relates to employee stock-pur-
chase plans the problem is not believed to be a very considerable one.
" New Jersey, Laws of 1920, chap. 175, §2, sub-sec. (c).
"California, Laws of 1921, chap. 34, §3.
Colorado, Laws of 1923, chap. 89, §3.
Pennsylvania, Laws of 1925, Act 368, §2.
"Louisiana, Laws of 1928, Act 250, §28, sub-sec. (c).
"Michigan, Public Acts of 1921, Act 84, Part II, chap. 2, §14, as amended
by Public Acts of 1927, Act 335.
EMPLOYEE STOCK-PURCHASE PLANS
There may be no dissenting shareholders in the given case. In most
states the use of treasury stock already held or stock bought in the
market for the purpose should avoid the difficulty. In Arkansas, for
instance, all that would be necessary would be to issue a new class
of stock to the employees since under the law of that state pre-emp-
tions arise only in favor of holders of stock of the class to be sold.
3. Paternalistic or single-level plans?
It is a rather safe observation that the majority of employees who
participate in employee stock-purchase plans do so for purposes of
investment without any serious interest in gaining a foothold in the
business. 28 Those workers who are eager for labor participation in
ownership and management are not content with any paternalistic
scheme of selling stock to employees. Where the workers are simply
looking for investment opportunities it might be wiser to refrain from
sinking all their savings in the future of a single enterprise and to
spread the risk by more diverse investments. Thus if not content with
the savings bank pace they might resort to investment trusts or set
up some of their own, a plan not without risks, to be sure. And a
company seeking to aid employees in investment may give them
financial advice, or, after the fashion of Henry Ford, issue .them
secured investment certificates instead of stock.
But there is a belief both within and without the ranks of their
promulgators that the plans are more than investment devices for
employees. If it is sought to apply this belief and to operate plans
with a view to giving employees some proprietary interest in the
business the paternalism of the general run of plans should be aban-
doned. The paternalistic attitude of mind has even invaded the
courts, as is illustrated by a decision fresh from the Supreme Court
of Michigan.29 There the statute permitted corporations to set up
plans of stock-selling to employees "upon consideration of such faith-
ful or continued employment" as they might prescribe. The statute
requires no spcial benefits for employees unless such is the import
of the clause quoted. Plans inaugurated under the statute and similar
plans were exempted from the Blue Sky Law. In this case the
Michigan court held that the plan before it did not come within
= This is the conclusion arrived at in the work of the National Industrial
Conference Board, Inc., op. cit. sunpra note 2, at 155. It is there stated that
like most small stockholders an employee stockholder is little interested in the
management so long as his investment pans out.
=Harvey v. Electric Refrigeration Corp., 246 Mich. 235, 224 N. W. 443(1929).
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the exemption because it did not give an appreciable advantage to
employees even in connection with their employment as compared with
that offered to the general public in the acquisition of stock. It does
not appear that the statute warranted this paternalistic requirement.
Services may be just as valuable a consideration for stock as cash.
And under the words of the statute a corporation could require a
high measure of "faithful and continued employment."
If employees are paid adequate wages they do not require pater-
nalism and special benefits. Except for the installment payment
feature stock should be offered to them on the same terms as to the
public. Self-respecting workers do not like to be thought of as
incompetents and objects of charity. Under this view of the subject
the usual option given the employee to withdraw from his subscrip-
tion at any time is an unnecessary concession, even if valid, a query
hereinafter considered.
If voting privileges are not attached to his stock a possible stimu-
lant to the employee's interest in the business is lost. To issue non-
voting stock to employees is prima facie evidence that the company
is fond of the old master and servant idea. The same line of reason-
ing commends common stock more strongly than preferred for this
purpose; it carries more of the business risks and possibilities.
4. Initiation of stock purchasing by labor.
Approaching the problem from the other side, that is, the inaugu-
ration by labor of a movement toward labor participation in indus-
trial ownership and management several interesting possibilities are
presented. The only way in which labor has been able, proprio
vigore, to get recognition in industry has been through organization.
Notwithstanding the possibility, as urged,30 that organization for
investment would avail labor little in generally shifting the seat of
capital, the organized purchasing and voting of shares by labor can
bring, and has brought, results in several instances.31
An unified voting strength may be attained by emnployees in two
principal ways: by voting trusts and by corporations erected to hold
and vote their stock. The voting trust might be set up with trustees
of their own selection to hold and vote the workers' shares. Whether
" Hardman and Associates, op. cit. supra note 8, chap. 3; "The New Cap-
italism," by Lewis Corey.
This is the suggestion of W. Jett Lauck in his book, POLITICAL AND IN-
DUSTRIAL DEmOcRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1926) in his discussion of the
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. plan, at 301 et seq.
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the employees regularly turned over part of their wages to the trus-
tees with which to buy stock for their benefit or transferred their
shares in trust after purchasing such themselves the result would
be the same. In either case there would be a voting trust in fact.
The principal features of such a scheme where the trustees buy the
stock with employee contributions are embodied in the plan of the
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, a plan, significantly enough,
initiated by the corporation itself.5 2
That there is nothing essentially objectionable about voting trusts
is now generally conceded.3 3 In a number of states voting trusts
are expressly authorized and regulated by statutes.5 4 A significant
feature of most of those statutes in this regard is a provision that
when a voting trust has been erected all stockholders not already
participating may come into the trust according to the terms of the
original declaration of trust.3 5 By this means a coalition between
the labor vote and other minority groups might be facilitated. Since
the trustees would have been chosen in advance by labor, later entrants
into the trust would know in advance how the stock would be voted.
But there are states which overthrow voting trusts. The North
Carolina court has gone so far as to declare them bad on consider-
ations of public policy.30
The second plan involves the setting up of a corporation by the
employees either to take their contributions and buy stock or to take
stock already purchased by the employees. The voting trust diffi-
culty could be eliminated when necessary by having the voting cor-
poration issue its shares in exchange for employees' shares in the
principal company. If it might qualify as a non-profit corporation
" For a summary of this plan see Foerster and Dietel, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 151, 152.
" This is the thesis of Maurice Finkelstein in his article, Voting Trust
Agreements (1926), 24 MIcH. L. Rav. 344. See also HARRY A. CUSHING,
VOTING TRUSTS (1916) passim.
"Through 1928 the following states had statutes authorizing voting trusts:
Arkansas and Nevada (voting trusts good for five years) ; California (statute
applicable Only to corporations organized to produce and market agricultural
goods); Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio
(voting trusts good for ten years).
"See for example the New York statute. Laws of New York, 1923, chap.
787, §50.
" Harvey v. Linville Imp. Co., 118 N. C. 693, 24 S. E. 489 (1896) ; Bridgers
v. Staton, 150 N. C. 216, 63 S. E. 892 (1909) ; Shepherd v. Power Co., 150
N. C. 776, 64 S. E. 894 (1909) ; Bridgers v. First Nat. Bank, 152 N. C. 293,
67 S. E. 770 (1910).
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which is doubtful,86' the voting company could avoid some of the
trouble and expense attached to corporate enterprises.
There is an English instance of a firm of partners organizing
a limited company among its employees-to enter the firm as a limited
partner.3 7 Under such an arrangement there would be no labor par-
ticipation in management in this country because limited partners
under the uniform8 s and individual state statutes3 9 share in the man-
agement only at the risk of incurring personal liability. But, since
the corporation would insulate the employee members against per-
sonal liability, they should not be averse to its entrance into the firm
as an active partner.
Cumulative voting is another device helpful to employees in voting
their stock to the best advantage. But it is a factor that they can
utilize only where they find it because it is quite out of their control.
Professor Ripley of Harvard 'has urged the merits of cumulative
voting to labor with good cause but he failed to tell the workers how
to get it when they did not already have it.40 It appearing that
there was no common-law right to vote cumulatively it has been held
that there is no such power in the absence of statute granting it. But
today thirty-three states have statutes either giving the right directly
or providing that it may be given by charter or by-laws.
Two states, Massachusetts and New Jersey, have by statute
authorized corporations to provide for the election by their employees
of one or more members to the board of directors independently of
stock ownership. 42 During about a decade no similar legislation has
' Application of Pittsburgh Chevrolet Dealers' Ass'n., Inc., 146 At. 26
(Pa. 1929). Held--Corporation not in non-profit class where it is erected to
increase the profits of a limited class.
" Messrs. Gilbert Brothers of Nantwich, England, was the firm in question,
whose plan is described by Calvert Magruder in Labor Copartnership in In-
dustry (1922) 35 HAuv. L. REv. 910, 920, 921, citing a description thereof in
Report on Profit Sharing and Labor Co-partnership in the United Kingdom(1920), issued by the Ministry of Labor.
Uniform Limited Partnership Act. §7.
See, for example, the North Carolina statute. N. C. Code (Michie 1927),
§3273. And see BuRnscx oN PARTNERSHIP (3rd ed. 1917), 411, MVcHEM, ELE-
MENTS OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920), 413.
"Labor Investment Suggestions (1926). 33 American Federationist 306,
307. On the same occasion he further advised the workers as follows: '--above
all things insist that the position of the worker shall be as free and as self-
respecting as that of every other member of the community who chooses to
entrust his savings to others for management."
'2 THrOmpsoN, CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1927), p. 364: State ex rel. Baum-
gardner v. Stockley, 45 Ohio St. 304. 13 N. E. 279 (1887) ; Gregg v. Granby
Mining and Smelting Co., 164 Mo. 616, 65 S. W. 312 (1901).
'New Jersey, Laws of 1920, chap. 175, §1, subsec. (d); Massachusetts,
General Laws of 1921, chap. 156, §23.
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appeared in other states. It is doubtful, hoWever, if the idea will
spread. Those in control must take the initiative in granting power
away under the statutes. And it is probably felt that labor now has
a chance at representation on boards of directors through normal
channels.
5. Employee subscription contracts-consideration.
It is usually provided in employee stock-purchase plans that title
shall not pass and the subscriber shall not become a shareholder until
full payment. Otherwise, the general rule would operate, namely,
that a subscription to stock without more constitutes the subscriber
a stockholder immediately upon acceptance.
These plans quite commonly allow the employee to cancel his
subscription at any time. Some provide that in the event of revoca-
tion by the employee-subscriber the stock shall be sold by the com-
pany and the proceeds applied first to the satisfaction of unpaid in-
stallments and costs of sale before paying the balance to the em-
ployee. 48 But the majority more liberally provide for the return to
the employee of all credits plus interest.44  Under the former type
of provision there is no question of absence of consideration, because
the employee's exercise of his option to revoke costs him something.
It is in the latter sort of plan that a draftsman who desires to make
it binding must be careful to inject a bit of legal consideration into
a subscription agreement somewhere.
The best way to eliminate the whole difficulty is, as previously
suggested, to draft the plan without giving an option to cancel.
But let us assume that the inclusion of the option is insisted upon
and it is desired at the same time to have the company bound at all
events. If there is just a promise to buy in consideration for a
promise to sell without more and no down-payment an option in one
party to cancel, of course, renders the transaction not binding. But
there may be elements of consideration in the collateral provisions of
a plan entering into a subscription which would bind the company
at all events.
" The stipulation in the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. plan
of 1923 was of this type. See the summary thereof in Foerster and Dietel,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 113, 114.
"The plan of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, as amended
to May 1925, provided that upon revocation by the employee the company would
return the amount of his credits With six per cent interest compounded quarterly.
Reprinted in JAMEs AND AssocIATEs, PROFIT SHARING AND STOCK OWNERSHIP
Poa EMPLOYS (1926), at 286, 290.
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There are at least three methods by which the contract may be
made legally sufficient with respect to consideration over and above
the simple device (still effective in some states) of putting the agree-
ment under seal." 1. There may be some executed consideration
such as a down-payment. A sure step would be to require a non-
returnable down-payment of a nominal sum. But without such a
payment and notwithstanding the agreement of the corporation to
return all credits including down-payments with interest upon can-
cellation, a returnable down-payment might supply a consideration by
reason of the temporary loss to the employees. This may, true
enough, be a rather flimsy affair since the employee could, by revoking
at will, limit the loss of use of the money paid to a moment's time,
but that, if specifically bargained for, would be enough.4 0
2. The option may be limited.47 This may be effected by such
a simple provision as that it can not be exercised except upon thirty
days' notice or only after the expiration of thirty days from the day
the subscription was made. But the limitation should always be
definite. Even then the transaction might not satisfy the courts.
Thus in a recent New York case the Court of Appeals unnecessarily
confused a corporation's limited option to repurchase stock upon
termination of employment if the company had a sufficient surplus
with an absolute option.48 The decision of the court, however,
rested mainly upon the New York statute making it a crime for
directors to buy shares of a corporation's stock out of capital.
3. The agreement may contain other promises of a sort which do
not render it divisible and which are absolutely binding on the sub-
scriber. Thus the promise of the employee that he will take no stock
in a competing corporation during the period of his employment will
'In all common law states, of course, where the rule has not been changed
by statute a seal "conclusively imports" i.e. dispenses with the necessity for,
consideration. North Carolina is in this class.
"6 It has not been thought necessary to state in the text of this paper that
the idea that a contract must have mutuality of legal obligation to be legally
enforceable is a misconception very nearly dissipated at this day. Such mutual-
ity is often involved as a basis of consideration in bi-lateral agreements, as
mutual promises, but it is never essential. It may be made the sole basis of
consideration in a given instance. But the important point at law is-there
must be consideration. 1 WuLSroN, CoNTRAcrs (1920) §140.
,'Thus a promise of a purchaser of land to purchase if the title was satis-
factory was held enforceable because he was bound to exercise honest judgment,
which limited his option. Hollingsworth v. Colthurst, 78 Kans. 455, 96 Pac.
851 (1908).
N. E. 735 (1928).
"Topken, Loring and Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163
N. E. 735 (1928).
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suffice. There is eminent authority for the view that a stipulation
for the giving of written notice of the exercise of the option to cancel
is consideration. 49 This is drawing the issue down to a fine point
whether one regards the promise to give written notice as a limitation
upon the option or a promise in itself constituting consideration. The
North Carolina court, however, has recently subscribed to this view.50
Assuming non-enforceability of the subscription contract when
made, will subsequent payments give it binding effect? It may be,
even in the case of a bilateral agreement, that there is nothing more
than an option until it is acted upon. So in an Alabama case 51 one
lumber company had contracted to buy the output of another until
it should notify the seller to discontinue cutting. The court held that
the buyer upon cancelling after so much lumber was cut was re-
sponsible in damages for refusing to accept the remainder of the cut
lumber. But, unlike an employee's subscription contract, that agree-
ment was divisible. It is believed, however, that the employee's sub-
scription might be rendered binding by subsequent payments if the
contract specified the actual making of one or more installment pay-
ments as consideration for the company's entire undertaking.
52
6. Provision for contingencies involved in termination of employ-
ment.
A related question arises out of the provision for revocation of
partially paid-up subscriptions in the event of termination of em-
ployment. No one answer would fit the requirements of every plan.
The following general scheme is suggested as an equitable though
none-too-easily applied arrangement to govern this contingency.
1. Death or permanent disability of the employee revokes the sub-
scription. 2. Discharge for cause effects revocation. 3. The com-
pany has an option to cancel if the employee voluntarily quits the
service. 4. Upon discharge without cause the employee has an
"Arthur L. Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration (1925), 34
YALE L. J. 571, 587.
'Fawcett v. Fawcett, 191 N. C. 679, 132 S. E. 796 (1926). And see Gur-
fein v. Werbelovsky, 97 Conn. 703, 118 Atl. 32 (1922) ; commented upon in
(1923) 32 YALE L. J. 496.
"McIntire Export and Lumber Co., 165 Ala. 268, 51 So. 767 (1910).
Accord: Malloy v. Egyptian Tie and Lumber Co., 212 Mo. App. 429, 247 S. W.
469 (1923). In this latter case the defendant had written to the plaintiff statin,
"enter our order for all your oak ties till further notice." Held-unenforce-
able when made but the defendant is bound for the price of ties cut and deliv-
ered before "further notice."
"See the advice of Professor Corbin, loc. cit. supra note 47, at 590.
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option to revoke. It would be advisable to call upon independent
parties to determine whether the discharge was for cause. 5. Tem-
porary lay-offs do not revoke or give ground for revocation.
Another and more simple solution, which would not breed con-
troversial questions, would be a provision that any permanent termi-
nation of the employment would revoke the erstwhile employee's
subscription automatically. That provision would not defeat con-
sideration because neither party could bring about revocation without
giving up a subsisting legal relationship. There could then arise no
controversies over such questions as whether the discharge was for
cause.55
7. Agreements and options to repurchase or resell stock.
Since a corporation is the party interested in keeping its employee-
stock out of the hands of competitors and since the purpose of em-
ployee-ownership fails upon termination of employment the option
is usually one reserved by the company to repurchase rather than
one in the employee to resell. Options of either type are most com-
mon in the individual contracts of sale of stock to particular em-
ployees, usually of managerial rank.54 An option of either kind will
be enforced when it arises out of the agreement of the parties and
such considerations as the rights of creditors are not involved.
Though statutes in some states55 expressly authorize corporations
" In Laridn v. Stewart, 248 Ill. App. 152 (1928) the plaintiff, an employee of
the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, had participated in its plan under which
stock was purchased for employees by trustees, who were upon maturity of the
plan to make over the stock to the participants. The plan made subscriptions
revocable by discharge for good cause (of which the trustees were to be the solejudges). Plaintiff was discharged just prior to the maturity of the plan and
in this action sought full benefits of the plan. Held: the granting of such relief
below was error since under the plan the trustees were not required to deter-
mine that the discharge was for cause or to give the employee notice so that
he might have a hearing as ruled by the trial court. This suit would hardly
have been instituted had the plan simply provided that any permanent termina..
tion of the employment would revoke an employee's subscription.
" A number of cases involving these contracts is cited in the note to Halsey
v. Boomer, 236 Mich. 328, 210 N. W. 209, 48 A. L. R. 622 (1926). See Cobb
v. Library Bureau, 167 N. E. 765 (Mass, 1929).
Connecticut, General Statutes, §3429; Delaware, Revised Code, chap. 65,
§19; Florida, Corporation Law of 1925, §8, sub-sec. 3; Maryland, Bagby's An-
notated Code, Art. 23, §50; Missouri, Revised Statutes, as amended by Laws
of 1927, p. 394; Nevada, Laws of 1925, chap. 177, §9, sub-sec. 3; North Dakota,
Compiled Laws of 1913, §4531; Ohio, General Corporation Act 1927, §41;
Oklahoma, Compiled Laws of Oklahoma of 1921, §5320; Rhode Island, General
Laws of Rhode Island, 1923, §5 (g), as amended by Laws of 1928, 1182, §1;
South Dakota, Revised Code of 1919, §§8777, 8808. The Louisiana statute is
especially significant in this regard. It authorizes a corporation to purchase
its own stock when the purchase is to obtain stock for resale to employees
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to deal in their own stock, the contrary is the law of others.56 In
New York it is a misdemeanor for directors to purchase stock in the
corporation out of capital,5 7 and it is generally understood that in
any case, save under statutes allowing this course of action as a
method of decreasing capital stock, a company may buy its own
shares only out of surplus.58 But even in states where corporations
are forbidden to deal in their own shares a provision in a stock sub-
scription giving the subscriber an option to resell to the company
has been upheld as an essential inducement of the subscription. 59
The same reasoning would support a provision obligating the com-
pany to repurchase upon the occurrence of a stated contingency, such
as termination of employment, which does not necessarily depend upon
the will of the subscriber.6"
But options in the corporation to repurchase as distinguished
froin an agreement to repurchase oran option in the other party to
resell have met with the objection that they are restraints upon
alienation and void as such.
In Lawson v. Household Finance Corporation61 the plaintiff was
seeking to compel the defendant to transfer shares to him on its
books. The shares had been issued to D, an employee of the de-
fendant, and upon the certificate was printed a provision of the
charter and by-laws of the defendant giving it a twenty-day option
to buy the shares at an appraised value arrived at without consider-
ing the company's good will, in the event the holder decided to trans-
fer the stock. D sold to plaintiff in violation of the option provision.
Plaintiff admitted that the defendant's business of making small loans
on chattel mortgage security through the agency of scattered em-
under the statute providing for same and under a repurchase agreement with
an employee, which reserves to the corporation the right to repurchase or
obligates it to do so. Louisiana, Laws of 1928, Act 250, §23.
Kentucky is an example. Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1922, §544.
" Topken, Loring and Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, supra note 48, citing
Consolidated Laws of New York, chap. 40, §664 (5).
'As generally stated it is the rule that agreements of a corporation to
repurchase stock cannot be enforced where the rights of creditors would be
infringed thereby. Schulte v. Blvd. Gardens Land Co., 164 Cal. 464, 129 Pac.
582, 44 L. P. A. (N. S.) 156, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1013 (1913) ; Pender v. Speight,
159 N. C. 612, 75 S. E. 851. And this has been held to apply in favor of other
stockholders. Sarback v. Kansas Fiscal Agency Co., 86 Kan. 734, 122 Pac.
1136Ann. Cas. 1913C, 415 (1912).
Schulte v. Blvd. Gardens Land Co., supra note 58.
In Strodl v. Farrish-Stafford Co., 145 App. Div. 406, 130 N. Y. Supp. 35
(1911) such an agreement was held valid at common law. Koch v. Val Verde
Mercantile Corp. 4 S. W. (2d) 662 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928).
147 Atl. 312 (Del. Chan. 1929).
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ployees was peculiarly dependent upon individual efficiency for its
success and that employee stock-ownership was conducive to this end,
The decision of the court denying plaintiff relief was that the re-
strictions embraced in the terms of the option were reasonable with
reference to their purpose and, therefore, valid.
If restrictions upon the alienation of stock are authorized by
statute they are upheld. 62 Under section 15 of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act 63 it is provided that there shall be no restriction upon
the transfer of shares by virtue of any by-laws of the company, or
otherwise, unless the restriction is stated upon the stock certificate.
But to construe this statute to confer any positive authority upon
corporations, even by implication, would hardly be consistent with its
plain terms. It has been held in Illinois where this statute was
deemed applicable that restrictions upon the general right to transfer
shares, provided they are reasonable and not contrary to any law'or
public policy, are valid. 64 The court in the case cited upheld cor-
porate by-laws giving the corporation through its directors the right
to object to any proposed transfer of shares if they supplied another
purchaser to take at the prevailing market price. But in a later Illi-
nois case the other restrictions were held to be unreasonable.6 5 There
a mutual agreement between all the stockholders, which was made a
by-law of the company, provided that none would sell any shares
without the written consent of all the others, except among them-
selves, and that, should any member desire to sell, the purchaser
must be approved by a majority of the members and become a party
to the agreement. This arrangement was declared void because under
it a majority of the stockholders could prevent a sale of stock.
Restrictions authorized in the charter of a corporation are gen-
erally upheld if they satisfy the test of reasonableness. 6 The
Delaware case discussed above is an example. 67
'Chaffee v. Farmers' Co-op Elevator Co., 39 N. D. 585, 168 N. W. 616(1918).
SUp to 1928 twenty-one states had adopted the act.
People ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924).
People ex rel. Malcom v. Lake Sand Corp., 251 Ill. App. 499 (1929).
fBlloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 177 N. Y. Supp. 873 (1919); Albert E,
Tauchet, Inc. v. Tauchet, 163 N. E. 184 (Mass. 1928). And see the cases cited
in Lawson v. Finance Corp., supra note 61, at 315. In the Bloomingdale case
Ford, J., declared: "I have sought diligently but without success for a case
impeaching the legality of reasonable restrictions upon the transfer of the stock
of a corporation when they are imposed by the charter, articles of association,
or certificate of incorporation, and notice of the restriction is stamped on the
certificate of stock."
" Lawson v. Finance Corp., supra note 61.
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As respects restrictions authorized or set out solely in the by-laws
it has been held on the one hand that without at least charter,68 and
preferably, statutory 69 authorization the corporation is without au-
thority to create such restrictions.70 Again they have been defeated
as unreasonable restraints upon alienation even though they simply
reserved to the corporation a pre-emption in case a holder elected to
sell his stock.7 1 On the other hand, there are decisions, which uphold,
as reasonable, restrictions in the by-laws of the type last-mentioned.72
Where the restrictions are imposed purely by agreement of the
parties there should be little question unless they would substantially
violate the public policy of keeping property alienable and readily
subject to circulation. But there is no public policy against options.
And as said in Model Clothing House v. Dickinson,7 3 where the five
members of a corporation had agreed not to sell their stock without
giving the company and each other an opportunity to buy on the
terms on which the sale was proposed, no reason appears why the
mutual agreement of the type involved in that case could fairly be
stamped an objectionable restraint upon alienation.
That, in brief, is the state of the decisions. Their lesson to the
draftsman of an employee stock purchase plan is to make the com-
pany's option to repurchase upon termination of employment a bare
option to buy at market prices, or, if the stock is not on the market,
at the then value as determined by independent appraisers. Any dis-
advantage to the employee as a stockholder in this regard leaves an
' Kinnan v. Sullivan County Club, 26 App. Div. 213, 50 N. Y. Supp. 95(1898) ; Driscoll v. Mfg. Co., 59 N. Y. 96 (1874).
Kretzer v. Cole Bros. Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S. W. 1066 (1916).
"Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 19 R. I. 180, 32 Atl. 921 (1895); S. C.,
.21 R .1 9, .41 Atl. 258 (1898).
"Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 86 Md. 129, 34 Atl. 1127 (1896).
Sterling Loan and Investment Co. v. Litel, 75 Colo. 34, 223 Pac. 753(1924) ; Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N. E. 934 (1902). In the Barrett
-case Chief Justice Holmes threw out this interesting suggestion favorable to
such restrictions: "Stock in a corporation is not merely property. It also
,creates a personal relation analagous otherwise than technically to a partner-
ship ... there seems to be no greater objections to retaining one's associates
in a corporation than in a firm." Much the same view is expressed in Lawson
v. Finance Corp., sitpra note 61, at 317.
"146 Minn. 367, 178 N. W. 957 (1920). A by-law giving the company a
pre-emption assented to by positive vote of every shareholder would be, in
effect, an agreement mutually entered into by all and should bind all like the
express agreement in the case cited. It was held in New England Trust Co. v.
Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432, 27 L. R. A. 271 (1891) that a by-law,
without considering its validity as such, which gave the company an option to
buy upon any transfer of stock and which was printed upon all stock certificates
'bound the stockhnlder as an agreement with the corporation, or enforceable
'by the corporation.
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opening for charges of unreasonable restraints upon alienation,
whether well-founded or not. If the jurisdiction is one where cor-
porations may not deal in their own shares the purpose of the usual
option could be served as to closed corporations by reserving the
option in favor of other shareholders.
8. Fitting the plan to the industry.
The foregoing discussion has been limited to labor's proprietary
participation in business organized on the corporate basis because
that largely marks the limits of the development. And this is not to
be understood as meaning that all the legal problems and incidents
have been disposed of. Other questions will always appear. Thus Blue
Sky Laws must be complied with as to stock to be sold to employees.
7 4
Moreover, as a practical consideration attention must always be given
to the size and character of the industry for which a plan is being
drafted.
Though it is believed that the corporation is the type of business
unit best adapted to the idea of labor participation in the ownership
and control of industry, as thus far developed, the idea can be applied
to other types. 75 In any case a plan for labor participation must be
fitted to the business unit and not vice versa.
"See the case of Harvey v. Electric Refrigeration Corp,, supra note 29.
The California statute providing for employee stock purchase plans expressly
makes issues of stock thereunder subject to the Blue Sky Law. California,
Laws of 1921, chap. 34, §4.
" The application of the idea to other forms of business organization than
the corporate is discussed by Calvert Magruder, loc. cit. supra note 37. And
see earlier in the present paper at note No. 37.
